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In applying Article 234 (ex Article 177) of the EC Treaty the European Court of 
Justice has been faced with a recurring problem: What to do with requests from 
national courts for a preliminary ruling on disputes that fall clearly outside the 
scope of Community law, but to which Community rules were made more or 
less applicable by national law. May the Court give a preliminary ruling in such 
cases under Article 234 EC or would that go beyond its jurisdiction? As first 
demonstrated in Thomasdünger, and then later, in a more reasoned judgment of 
Dzodzi, the Court assumed jurisdiction over preliminary references in such 
instances.' The Court has follow the central principle of these decisions in a 
long line of cases in the last twenty years (the so-called ",ázodzi line of cases", 
as the Court first called it in the Leur-Bloein and Giloy judgements)2 in spite of 
the fact that the line of Advocates General who have, with considerable force, 
opposed this .pproach, has been also long, e.g. AG Mancini (in Thomasdünger) 
AG Damon (in Dzodzi and Gmurzynska-Bscher), AG Tesauro (in Kleinwort 
Benson), AG Jacobs (in Leur!•'loem, Giloy and MAO), or AG Ruiz-Jarabo 
Colomer (in Kofisa). 3 
Case 166/84 Thomasdünger GmbH v Oberfinanzdirektion Frankfurt am Main [1985] ECR 
3001; Joined Cases C-297/88 and C-197/89 M. Dzodzi v Belgium [1990] ECR I-3763. 
2 Case C-130/95 Bernd Giloy v Hauptzollamt Frankfurt am Main-Ost [1997] ECR I-4291, 
par. 23.; Case C-28/95 A. Leur-Bloem v Inspecteur der Belastingdienst/Ondememingen 
Amsterdam 2. [1997] ECR I-4161, par. 29. 
3 Case 166/84 Thomasdünger GmbH v Oberfinanzdirektion Frankfurt am Main [ 1955] ECR 
3001, Opinion of AG Mancini delivered on 15 May 1985; Joined Cases C-297/88 and C-197/89 
M. Dzodzi v Belgium [1990] ECR 1-3763, per AG Darmon, paras. 8-16.; Case C-231/89 
Krystyna Gmurzynska-Bscher v Oberfinanzdirektion Köln [ 1990] ECR 1-4003, per AG Darmon, 
paras. 5-14. ; Case C-346/93 Kleinwort Benson Ltd. v City of Glasgow District Council [1995] 
ECR 1-0615, per AG Tesauro paras. 16-28.; Leur-Bloem and Giloy, ibid., per AG Jacobs (joined 
opinion) paras. 24-82; Case C-306/99 Banque Internationale pour l'Afrique Occidentale SA 
(BIAO) v Finanzamt mr GroBunternehmen in Hamburg [2003] ECR 1-0001, per AG Jacobs, 
paras. 40-71. See also LENAERTS, K.: The Unity of European Law and the Overload of the ECJ - 
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In this paper I do not purport to make general objections to, or provide 
support for, the Dzodzi jurisprudence. The opinions and arguments of the 
Advocates General in the above-mentioned cases are duel]-known, 4 and many 
commentators have taken sides on the issue. 5 Instead, I intend to provide some 
analysis on consistency of this case-law, taking the recent developments also 
into account. 
1. The "necessity" criterion in Article 234 EC 
In Dzodzi the Court's justification for finding that it has jurisdiction to interpret 
Community rules that are applicable by virtue of national law in disputes falling 
outside the ambit of EC law, is surprisingly thin. It observes that "...it is 
manifestly in the interest of the Community legal order that, in order to forestall 
future differences of interpretation, every Community provision should be given 
a uniform interpretation irrespective of the circumstances in which it is to be 
applied.i6 As the wording of Article 234 EC does not prevent the Court from 
giving a preliminary ruling in such circumstances, and as it does provide for a 
judicial cooperation where the Court shall give support to national courts in 
interpreting Community provisions, the Court thus has jurisdiction to meet these 
goals.' This line of reasoning, by which the objections raised by various 
Advocates General have been repeatedly rejected, has been reaffirmed in many 
cases. As the central principle laid down by the Court in Dzodzi has firmly 
The System of Preliminary Rulings Revisited, in: PERNICE, I. — KOKOTT, J. — SAUNDERS, C. (eds.): 
The Future of the European Judicial System in a Comparative Perspective. Nomos, Baden-
Baden, 2006. p. 225. 
4 See, ibid. Oliver provides a good summary on the arguments of the Advocates General, see 
OLIVER P.: La recevabilité des questions préjudicielles: la jurisprudence des armies 1990. 
Cahiers de.droit européen 2001/1-2., pp. 37-38. For such summary, see also ANDERSON, D.W.K. 
— DEMETRIOU, M.: References to the European Court. Sweet and Maxwell, London 2002, pp. 72-
73. 
5 See e.g. KALEDA, S. L.: Extension of the preliminary rulings procedure outside the scope of 
Community law: 'The Dzodzi line of cases'. European Integration online Papers (EIoP) Vol. 4 
(2000) N° 11., pp. 8-19., 26-31. <http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2000- 011 a.htm> (visited on 23 
September 2008); LEFÉVRE, S.: The interpretation of Community law by the Court of Justice in 
areas of national competence. (2004) 29 E.L.Rev., pp. 501-516., Oliver , supra note 4., p. 38., 
TRIDIMAS: Knocking on Heaven's Door: Fragmentation, Efficiency and Defiance in the 
Preliminary Reference Procedure. (2003) 40 CML Rev., pp. 34-37.; RASMUSSEN, H.: Remedying 
the crumbling EC judicial system. (2000) 37 CML Rev. p. 1083.; BISHOP, E. M.: Kleinwort 
Benson: A good Example of Judicial Self-restraint? (1995) 20 E. L. Rev., pp. 495-501. 
6 Joined Cases C-297/88 and C-197/89 M. Dzodzi v Belgium [1990] ECR I-3763, par. 37. 
Lefevre regards this point as the principal justification for the whole Dzodzi jurisprudence, see 
Leavre, supra note 5., p. 508. 
' Dzodzi, ibid., paras. 32. and 36. For the summary of the resoning, see e.g. Oliver, supra 
note 4., p. 36. 
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prevailed for more than twenty years, 8 the main question nowadays is the fine-
tuning of its application in various situations, by which its limits and 
characteristics are explored. 
This f ne-tuning has centered on a principal issue of jurisdiction. The Court has 
often reiterated that it is the referring national court that has to assess the need 
to obtain a preliminary ruling in light of the facts of the dispute at issue. It is the 
national court that is fully aware of the facts and legal background of the 
particular case, so it is in the best position to appraise the appropriateness of a 
question or questions being referred to the Court for a preliminary ruling. 
However, at the same time, Article 234 EC contains important conditions on the 
Court's jurisdiction to give a preliminary ruling, over which the Court should 
retain control.9 After having given, in the 1960s, the greatest deference to the 
national courts' assessment of the appropriateness of their references in the 
decisions of Albairos, Salgoil, or Portelange,10 the Court seemed to recover this 
control in the early 1980s in the famous Foglia (II) ruling."    
8 See, e.g. Case C-1/99 Kofisa Italia Srl v Ministero delle Finanze, Servizio della 
Riscossione dei Tributi - Concession Provincia di Genova - San Paolo Riscossioni Genova SpA 
[2001] ECR 1-0207.; Case C-267/99 Christiane Urbing-Adam v Administration de 
l'enregistrement et des domaines [2001] ECR I-7467.; Case C-222/01 British American Tobacco 
Manufacturing BV v Hauptzollamt Krefeld [2004] ECR 1-4683; Case C-3/04 Poseidon 
Chartering BV v Marianne Zeeschip VOF, Albert Mooij, Sjoerdtje Sijswerda, Gerrit Schram 
[2006] ECR I-2505; Case C-280/06 Autoriti Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato v Ente 
Tabacchi Italiani - ETI SpA and others [2007] ECR I-10893. 
9 For comments on the Court's growing control over admissibility conditions, see e.g. 
Tridimas, supra note 5., pp. 21-36., Anderson - Demetriou, supra note 4., pp. 104-124.; CRAIG, 
P.0 - DE BúitcA, G.: EU Law. Text, Cases and Materials. Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008, 
pp. 484-493., ARNULL, A.: The European Union and its Court of Justice. Oxford University 
Press, Oxford 2006, pp. 114-119. 
10 Case 13/68 SpA Salgoil v Italian Ministry of Foreign Trade [1968] ECR 0661, point I.; 
Case 10/69 S.A. Portelange v S.A. Smith Corona Marchant International and others [ 1969] ECR 
0309, par. 5.; Case 20/64 SARL Albatros v Société des pétroles et des combustibles liquides 
[1965] ECR 0041. 
11 In Foglia (II), balancing among various considerations, the Court put stress on the proper 
exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 234 EC and asserted: "Furthermore, it should be pointed 
out that, whilst the Court of Justice must be able to place as much reliance as possible upon the 
assessment by the national court of the extent to which the questions submitted are essential, it 
must be in a position to make any assessment inherent in the performance of its own duties in 
particular order to check, as all courts must, whether it has jurisdiction. Thus the Court, taking 
into account the repercussions of its decisions in this matter, must have regard, in exercising the 
jurisdiction conferred upon it by Article [234], not only to the interests of the parties to the 
proceedings but also to those of the Community and of the Member States. Accordingly it cannot, 
without disregarding the duties assigned to it, remain indifferent to the assessments made by the 
courts of the Member States in the exceptional cases in which such assessments may affect the 
proper working of the procedure laid down by Article [234]." Case 244/80 Pasquale Foglia v. 
Mariella Novello (II). [1981] ECR 3045, par. 19. See also Craig, supra note 9., pp. 484-488., 
CHALMERS, D. - TOMKINS, A.: European Union Public Law. Text and Materials. Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge 2007. pp. 287-291., and 297. 
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In this regard, the central concept of Article 234 EC is the "necessity", that is  
when it is necessary for the Court to reply to questions referred to it for a  
preliminary ruling so that the national court can make a decision (give a  
judgment) in a particular case. The Court's jurisprudence relating to  
admissibility questions under the provision is in significant part the chain of  
attempts at determining the degree of the Court's control over the necessity  
criterion in light of the factual backgrounds of various cases.  
Thus, in situations which the Court has confronted in the Dzodzi line of 
cases, the principal admissibility issue is how much deference the Court should  
accord to the national courts' decisions regarding the necessity of their requests  
for a preliminary ruling. What are the applicable standards by which the  
necessity factor can be controlled by the Court in particular cases? However, it  
is unnecessary to pursue here in general the point regarding this criterion,  
because only specific aspects of necessity appear in situations like that of the  
Dzodzi case. 12 Thus, the focus has to be placed in this respect upon the Dzodzi 
jurisprudence, though, it is far from being consistent. 
2. The ramifications of the necessity criterion in the Dzodzi line of cases  
According to the Dzodzi holding, the Court may decline jurisdiction over a  
preliminary reference "only if it were apparent either that the procedure  
provided for in Article [234] had been diverted from its true purpose and sought  
in fact to lead the Court to give a ruling by means of a contrived dispute, or that  
the provision of Community law referred to the Court for interpretation was  
manifestly incapable of applying.i 13 In this two-pronged test 14 the Court 
followed Foglia (I) and Foglia (II), asserting that only in the context of genuine 
disputes may it exercise jurisdiction to give a preliminary ruling 15 — however, 
12 For the general examination of the necessity criterion, see Anderson-Demetriou, supra 
note 4., pp. 91-95. 	 . 
13 Joined Cases C-297/88 and C-197/89 M. Dzodzi v Belgium [1990] ECR I-3763, par. 40.  
O'Kee,~e also emphasizes these two limits appearing in Dzodzi of the Court's jurisdiction under  
Article 234 EC, see O'KEEFFE, D.: Is the Spirit of Article 177 under Attack? Preliminary  
References and Admissibility. (1998) 23 E.L.Rev., p. 518.  
14 For further application of the test by the Court, see, e.g. Case C-118/94 Associazione  
Italiana per it World Wildlife Fund, Ente Nazionale per la Protezione Animali, Lega per 1'  
Ambiente — Comitato Regionale, Lega Anti Vivisezione — Delegazione Regionale, Lega per 1'  
Abolizione della Caccia, Fedematura Veneto and Italia Nostra — Sezione di Venezia v Regione  
Veneto [ 1996] ECR I-1223, par. 15.; Case C-85/95 John Reisdorf v Finanzamt Köln—West  
[ 1996] ECR 1- 6257, par. 16. 
' Case 104/79 Pasquale Foglia v Mariella Novello (I) [1980] ECR 0745, par. 11.; Case  
244/80 Pasquale Foglia v Mariella Novello (II) [1981] ECR 3045, par. 18.  
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this rule has no significance within our subject. 16 On the other hand, the 
manifest inapplicability standard 17 which appeared in its early form in the 
Thomasdünger ruling (without the genuine dispute requirement) illustrates the 
turn which the Court took in the two Foglia holdings: it, in principle, does not 
examine the circumstances or conditions of the case which trigger the national 
court's reference' $ — but, the demand that Community rules apply to the case 
seems to be one of the most important constraints on this deference. 19 
The necessity criterion has other faces, of which the "obvious irrelevancy" 
standard which the Court seems to have set up first in its Salonia decision, is of 
special importance?° Under this standard the Court may reject a request for a 
preliminary ruling if it is quite obvious that the interpretation (or the 
examination of the validity) of a Community rule bears no relation to the actual 
nature or the subject matter of the case?' (Obviousness has been given up as a 
16 The Court did not explain how the genuine dispute requirement comes into the reasoning. 
The facts of the case did not raise any suspicion that Dzodzi would have been a contrived dispute. 
In Thomasdünger, the most important precedent to Dzodzi, the Court did not even mention this 
requirement. 
17 Appearing as "obvious" inapplicability in Case C-28/95 A. Leur-Bloem v Inspecteur der 
Belastingdienst/Ondernemingen Amsterdam 2. [1997] ECR 1-4161, par. 26.; Case C-130/95 
Bernd Giloy v Hauptzollamt Frankfurt am Main-Ost [1997] ECR 1-4291, par. 23.; Case C-
231/89 Krystyna Gmurzynska-Bscher v Oberfinanzdirektion Köln [1990] ECR I-4003, par. 23. 
18 Leur-Bloem, ibid., par. 25., Giloy, ibid., par. 22., Gmurzinska-Bscher, ibid. par. 22., Case 
C-118/94 Associazione Italiana per it World Wildlife Fund, Ente Nazionale per la Protezione 
Animali, Lega per 1' Ambiente - Comitato Regionale, Lega Anti Vivisezione - Delegazione 
Regionale, Lega per 1' Abolizione della Caccia, Federnatura Veneto and Italia Nostra - Sezione di 
Venezia v Regione Veneto [ 1996] ECR I-1223, par. 14.; Case C-85/95 John Reisdorf v 
Finanzamt Köln-West [ 1996] ECR I-6257, par. 15. 
19  The Court has in fact developed a complex set of various factors, standards or principles 
on which it may reject jurisdiction to give a preliminary ruling; however those grounds of refusal 
are "diverse, overlapping and, in some cases, still uncertain in their application." Anderson-
Demetriou, supra note 4., p. 104. The manifest inapplicability standard is a good example for this 
assertion. 
20 Only the necessity criterion has roots in the wording of Article 234, so it is puzzling which 
of the other grounds for declining jurisdiction can be derived directly from the textual appearance 
of this criterion, and which of them can be traced back to other parts or the general purposes of 
Article 234 EC, or to other provisions of Community law. The Court rulings are very succinct on 
the relationship between the necessity requirement and the other grounds of refusal. 
21  Case 126/80 Salonia v Poidomani and Giglio [1981] ECR 1563, par. 6., followed by the 
Court in e.g. Case C-368/89 Antönió Crispőltóni v Fattoria autonoma tabacchi di Cittu di 
Castello [1991] ECR I-3695, par. 11., Case C-186/90 Giacomo Durighello v Istituto Nazionále 
Della Previdenza Sociale [1991] ECR I-5773, . par. 9., Case C-343/90 Manuel José Louren'o 
Dias v Director da Alfandega do Porto. [1992] ECR 1-4673, par. 18., Case C-49/89 Corsica 
Ferries France v Direction générale des douanes fran'aises [ 1989] ECR 4453, par. 27., Case C-
230/96 Cabour SA and Nord Distribution Automobile SA v Arnor "SOCO" SARL [1998] ECR I-
2055, par. 21., Case C-129/94 Ruiz Bernaldez [1996] ECR I-1829, par. 7., Case C-125/96 
Hartmut Simon v Hauptzollamt Frankfurt am Main [1998] ECR 1-0145, par. 15. The standard has 
no strict fráming in the jurisprudence, e.g. in the Manfredi ruling it appears as the interpretation of 
a Community rule which „bears no relation to the facts of the main action or its purpose", Joined 
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criterion for irrelevancy, e.g. in the case of Reti Televisive Italiane, for 
unspecified reasons.)22 
The relationship between the two standards is not clear. If a question referred 
to the Court within a preliminary ruling procedure relates to a Community rule 
which is inapplicable to the case, the interpretation of this rule will also be 
irrelevant in the matter. The obvious irrelevancy standard is thus apt to absorb 
or to embrace the inapplicability factor — the inapplicability is assuredly a 
spec ific form of irrelevancy. Moreover, according to the obvious irrelevancy 
standard, the Court may reject the request of the referring national court only if 
the questions of interpretation or validity referred to the Court are obviously 
irrelevant. However, this "only if" restriction also appears in the context of the 
manifest inapplicability standard in Dzodzi (tied disjunctively to the genuine 
dispute condition), as well as in the cases to follow that contained these 
requirements. There appears to be one line of cases starting with Salonia where 
the Court declines jurisdiction over a preliminary reference only if the request is 
obviously irrelevant, and another one starting with Dzodzi (and with 
Thomasdinger, albeit using different wording) where this happens only if the 
Community rule to be interpreted by the Court is manifestly inapplicable (or the 
dispute is not genuine). It is obvious that in both lines of cases the same "only 
if" term cannot simultaneously be maintained. This throws light upon the fact 
that the substantive relationship of the various admissibility conditions is far 
from being clear in the Court's jurisprudence. 
In any case, it seems to me that it is only the manifest inapplicability 
standard of the necessity criterion which principally and relevantly applies in 
the Dzodzi jurisprudence (though its application is not limited to this; see, e.g. 
WWF Italia ruling). 23 However, in factual situations like those emerging, e.g. in 
Dzodzi, Leur-Bloem, Giloy, the use of the other, obvious irrelevancy standard is, 
in theory, not ruled out either: the interpretation of an otherwise inapplicable 
Community rule "bears no relation" (on account of its inapplicability) at least to 
the actual nature or possibly to the subject matter of a referred case — thus, the 
two standards could be convertible in this context. 
Cases C-295-298/04 Vincenzo Manfredi v Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA, Antonio Cannito 
v Fondiaria Sai SpA, and Nicol?) Tricarico and Pasqualina Murgolo v Assitalia SpA [2006] ECR 
I-6619, par. 27., or recently, ,,...bears no relation to the facts of the main action or to its subject-
matter", Case C-11/07 Hans Eckelkamp and others v Belgium, judgment of 11 September 2008; 
(not yet reported) par. 28. 
22 Pl. Joined Cases C-320/94, C-328/94, C-329/94, C-337/94, C-338/94 and C-339/94 Reti 
Televisive Italiane SpA , Radio Torre, Rete A Srl , Vallau Italian Promomarket Srl, Radio Italia 
Solo Musica Srl és társai és GETE Srl v Ministero delle Poste e Telecomunicazioni [1996] ECR 
1-6471, par. 23. 
23 Case C-60/05 WWF Italia and others v Regione Lombardia, [2006] ECR I-5083, 
especially par. 19. 
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3. If we took Dzodzi seriously ... in reading Benson 
In Dzoclzi the Court made it plain that it assumes jurisdiction over a preliminary 
reference if, and only if, the dispute is not fictitious or the Community rule to be 
interpreted is not manifestly inapplicable. Here, the Belgian law extended the 
reach of the Community law to purely internal situations by providing that 
residence in Belgium of the foreign spouse of a !: elgian national (a situation not 
governed by Community rules) was to be treated like that of a national of a 
Member State other than I:elgium (a matter governed by Community law). It 
was in this legal context, where Ms. Dzodzi had been the spouse of a Belgian 
national, and the dispute therefore entailed a wholly internal situation, that the 
Court replied to questions asked by the referring telgian court. is y exercising 
its jurisdiction under Article 234 EC, the Court implied, and in fact set up, the 
principle that a Community rule which is applicable to an internal situation only 
by force of domestic law is not manifestly inapplicable in a case involving such 
an internal situation for the pu ,loses of Article 234 EC. 
In this sense, the applicability of a Community rule means not only 
applicability by force of the Community law, but applicability on the basis of 
national legislation, as well. That explains why the "manifest" (or sometimes 
the "obvious") adjective in the wording of the standard is necessary for the 
Court. The word refers to only a very low-level, prima facie scrutiny of 
applicability. If a Community rule is applicable by virtue of national law, a 
significant uncertainty comes in from the Court's point of view: the extent and 
conditions of the applicability of Community rules are determined by national 
legislation, and the Court has no jurisdiction under Article 234 EC to interpret 
national legal rules, not even those giving extra effects to Community law. That 
is why the Court has to accord great deference in these situations to the national 
court's assessment of applicability (or would have had simply to disclaim 
jurisdiction to give interpretation over all such references). 
In order to save something of the Foglia approach in Dzodzi-like 
circumstances, the Court seems to have claimed some control over the 
applicability issue by resorting to the "manifest" qualifying adjective, which 
represents the limits (very weak limits, at first sight) of the national courts' 
assessments. If the Court sees a Community rule as manifestly (or obviously) 
inapplicable to the case even under national law and the national court has taken 
a contrary position in its reference without avail, the request for a preliminary 
ruling will not be admissible. !: gat when can the inapplicability be seen as 
manifest? What attribute does "manifest" ascribe to inapplicability? Given, that 
the Court may not interpret national legal rules within a preliminary ruling 
procedure, the manifest nature of inapplicability has to be conceptually based 
upon the absence of the need for interpretation. So, in this context, the standard 
of inapplicability "being manifest" can only be construed such that the 
inapplicability of a Community rule is reasonably clear and it can be established 
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— without any interpretative efforts — from the mere wording of the national law 
that aims to give extra effects to this rule. 
The first, serious test for this construction was the widely-known Kleinwort 
Benson case 24 Here, the national legislation of the United Kingdom had not 
incorporated the Community rules at issue by explicit reference, as is seen in 
Dzodzi, but the domestic legal rules applicable to internal situations had been 
modelled upon the Community rules for which the re ferring UK court then 
sought interpretation in Luxembourg. 25 
Rejecting jurisdiction to reply to the referred questions, the Court principally 
based its reasoning upon the factors that national legal rules (i) did not make a 
direct and unconditional reference to Community law to allow departure 
therefrom and (ii) provided that UK courts are not bound by the ECJ's decisions 
in applying to internal situations the rules transposed from the Brussels 
Convention.26 
The second of these reasons for refusal constitutes a potentially strong 
argument against jurisdiction, and, in my view, the only successful argument 
against jurisdiction in this case. The Court may not give purely advisory 
opinions that lack binding effect, because that would be incompatible with its 
judicial function. And therefore, if the application of its ruling is not required by 
national law in the context of a case, the reference cannot be admissible. 
However, it is interesting to note that this element of the national legislation has 
not been assessed under and tied to the manifest inapplicability standard (see 
paragraphs 20-24 of the judgment), although a Community rule can be seen as 
unconditionally applicable only if the Court's decisions that give it meaning are 
binding upon the Member State, including its courts. 27 The Court seemed to 
share the concerns of those opponents of Dzodzi who had placed the focus upon 
the risk that the Court would in such cases become a purely advisory body. But 
the position the Court took in Kleinwort Benson was significantly weakened by 
its previous Fournier ruling, where it had explicitly acknowledged the possibly 
non-binding nature of the interpretation given in the case. The Court there 
reasoned that the decision in the main dispute was within the jurisdiction of the 
national court, which might give such meaning to the terms of the agreement in 
24 Case C-346/93 Kleinwort Benson Ltd. v City of Glasgow District Council [1995] ECR 1-
0615. For a short survey on the case, see e.g. BETLEM, G. Case note on Case C-28/95 Leur-Bloem 
and Case C-130/95 Giloy. (1999) 36 CMLR, pp. 165-17g., Bishop, supra note 5., pp. 495-501. 
25  The reference was made for the interpretation of two phrases in Article 5 of the 1968 
Brussels Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial 
matters, and the preliminary ruling procedure began under Protocol of 1971 to the Brussels 
Convention, and not under Article 234 of the EC Treaty. 
26  Lenaerts, supra note 3., p. 226.; Arnull, supra note 9., pp. 108-109. Collins discusses the 
case in the context of UK domestic law, COLLINS, L.: The Brussels Convention within the United 
Kingdom. (1995) 111 The Law Quarterly Review, pp. 543-544. 
27 Lefevre is also inclined to establish link between the two factors, Letvre, supra note 5., p. 
504. 
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issue that it saw appropriate (! ), "without being bound in that regard by the 
meaning" attributed by the Court's decision to the corresponding (and the same) 
expression used in the Directive in issue In spite of the explicit variance, the 
Court has not even made an attempt to distinguish Kleinwort Benson from 
Fournier in this respect. 
Turning to the first principal reason for refusal of jurisdiction in Kleinwort 
Benson we can see that the Court explicitly referred to the manifest 
inapplicability standard in paragraph 19 of the judgment, which had not been 
met in the case. According to the Court, the provisions of the Convention 
"cannot be regarded as having been rendered applicable as such, in cases 
outwith the scope of the Convention". This contention — concerning the absence 
of applicability — is rooted in the following two factors: (1) the national law did 
not wholly reproduce the terms of the Convention and certain provisions of the 
national law departed from the wording of the corresponding Convention 
provision; (2) an explicit provision in the implementing Act allowed authorities 
to make changes "designed to produce divergence" between any provision of 
the Act and a corresponding provision of the Convention. 
In my view, Dzodzi would not have allowed this conclusion in Kleinwort 
Benson for at least three reasons. First, the Court clearly transgressed the limits 
of its jurisdiction. To reach the conclusion in the case, it had to interpret the Act 
of the United Kingdom, which was expressly acknowledged by the Court itself 
in paragraph 18 of the ruling. This clearly demonstrated a departure from 
Dzodzi where the Court had strictly kept away from assessing or interpreting 
national legal rules and given much greater deference to the national court's 
decision to refer. 
Second, the fact that the authorities had been empowered by the Act to make 
changes is irrelevant if they had not in fact taken steps extending to the facts of 
the case tied to the rules which had been transposed from the Convention 
provisions that were referred to the Court for interpretation. 29 However, in 
general, if a Community rule applies to various situations only by virtue of 
national law, such legislation may be subject to change at any time by unilateral 
act of the Member State. Still, the Court must have reckoned on such a 
possibility when engaging in this new jurisprudence starting from 
Thomasdünger. 
28  Case C-73/89 A. Fournier and others v V. van Werven, Bureau central fran9ais and others 
[1992] ECR I-5621, par. 23., see also Case C-346/93 Kleinwort Benson Ltd. v City of Glasgow 
District Council [ 1995] ECR I-0615, per AG Tesauro, par. 24. 
29  In other, but similar contexts, the importance of specific approach has been emphasized by 
AG Jacobs, Joined Cases C-321/94, C-322/94, C-323/94 and C-324/94 Jacques Pistre and 
others [1997] ECR I-2343, per AG Jacobs, par. 38. and AG Cosmas in Case C-63/94 
Groupement national des negociants en pommes de terre de Belgique (Belgapom) v ITM Belgium 
SA and Vocarex SA [1995] ECR 1-2467, per AG Cosmas, par. 14., cited by AG Jacobs, ibid., and 
RITTER, C.: Purely internal situations, reverse discrimination, Guimont, Dzodzi and Article 234. 
(2006) 31 E.L.Rev. October, p. 700. 
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Third, the Court was asked to interpret only two phrases of the Convention: 
"matters relating to a contract" within the meaning of Article 5(1) of the 
Convention, and "matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict" within the 
meaning of Article 5(3). In Dzodzi in setting up the manifest applicability 
standard the Court focused upon the provision of Community law referred to the 
Court for interpretation. It seems also irrelevant that all of the provisions of the 
Convention-had not been transposed verbatim -by__  the _Member  State into its 
national legislation. What counts is whether or not the transposed national rules 
departed from corresponding Articles 5(1) and 5(3) of the Convention; if so, to 
what extent they did, and whether the variance would have made the Court's 
interpretation of the corresponding Convention rules meaningless in the context 
of the case. In this respect, however, no reasoning has been offered by the 
Kleinwort Benson decision. . 
As follows from the foregoing, in Kleinwort Benson a different standard of 
manifest inapplicability was in fact applied by the Court than was applied in 
Dzodzi.3° Though AG Jacobs calls it "an uneasy compromise" between the two 
cases,31 I have to regard Kleinwort Benson as a clear exception to Dzodzi or 
Gmurzynska-Bscher - and not just for its outcome. 32 The inheritance of Dzodzi 
regards the national courts' enhanced power to assess the circumstances and 
legal context of the case referred to the Court and the necessity of reference. 
This power, which is more extensive than in other preliminary ruling cases, is 
necessary in view of the fact that in these cases the application of Community 
law is conditional upon national legal rules, and the Court, in theory, completely 
lacks jurisdiction to interpret those rules. A concomitant of the Court's 
upholding the Dzodzi ruling will be the wide-reaching power of national courts. 
4. The short life of "direct and unconditional renvoi" test 
Kleinwort Benson reveals one of the principal problems of the manifest 
inapplicability standard. Is there a case where Community rules does not apply 
to the facts in an internal situation, but the inapplicability is not manifest, so the 
Court does not lack jurisdiction to give substantive answers? . What does 
"manifest" mean in relation to inapplicability? Does this adjective designate a 
subjective requirement (if the Court takes notice of and determine the 
inapplicability it will be manifest), or an objective one (the certainty or degree 
of inapplicability)? The decision left open this question. The Court purported to 
30  Collins' claim that the Court followed previous cases in Kleinwort Benson seems to me 
unsupported and unpersuasive; Collins, supra note 26., p. 544. 
31 Case C-28/95 A. Leur-Bloem v Inspecteur der Belastingdienst/ Ondernemingen 
Amsterdam 2. [1997] ECR I-4161, and Case C-130/95 Bernd Giloy v Hauptzollamt Frankfurt am 
Main-Ost [1997] ECR 1-4291, per AG Jacobs (joined opinion), par. 68. 
32  The exceptional nature of the case is emphasized by O'Keeffe, supra note 13., p. 519. 
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derive from its previous cases a new test, "direct and unconditional renvoi", by 
which manifest inapplicability could in some way be measured in particular 
instances. However, this new demand introduced by Kleinwort Benson tested 
inapplicability and did not test the manifest nature thereof, and thus the "direct 
and unconditional renvoi" test apparently did not provide solution to the 
problem. 
The appraisal of the manner by which the national law incorporates 
Community rules implies the examination of the factual and legal context of the 
case. The application (and the manner of application) of Community rules in 
non-Community situations does not depend only on the pure texts of national 
legal rules, but on the case-law of national courts or administrative practices of 
the Member States' authorities that constitute parts of the body of national legal 
systems. Applying the test consistently might easily involve the extension of the 
Court's jurisdiction in these cases. 
The "direct and unconditional renvoi" test to weigh manifest inapplicability 
has clearly been given up by the Court in the Leur-Bloem case, which came to 
Luxembourg from the Netherlands, where the Court was asked to interpret the 
phrase "exchange of shares" for income tax purposes within the meaning of 
Article 2(d) of Council !Directive 90/434/EEC on the common system of 
taxation applicable to mergers, divisions, transfers of assets and exchanges of 
shares concerning companies of different Member States. The reference was 
made by the national court to determine whether the merger of share companies 
in the main proceedings could be qualified as a "merger by exchange of shares" 
under the Netherlands income tax law, and whether the respondent was entitled 
to receive a tax exemption on the gains which she had made by transferring her 
shares. Although the merger operation in question only embraced companies in 
the Netherlands, and so did not fall within the scope of the Directive, the Dutch 
law contained mutatis mutandis the same provision concerning the mergers of 
companies established in the Netherlands and those of companies established 
two or more Member States. 
In distinction to Dzodzi, the national law applicable in the case made no 
explicit reference to Community rules, and contained only two, in substance, 
identical clauses, one for internal merger transactions, and another for mergers 
in the Community context. In view of this legal background it would be hard to 
talk about "direct and unconditional renvoi" in this case. However, the Court — 
without applying the direct and unconditional renvoi test — assumed jurisdiction 
and gave answers to the Amsterdam court's questions. It did so in a case where 
the Community rule at issue might contribute to the interpretation of a national 
legal rule which was not applicable in the main proceedings, but which was, in 
substance, identical with another national legal provision covering the wholly 
internal factual situation of the dispute. 
In reaching this decision it might have been important that the referring court 
took the view that under national law, the same treatment should be accorded to 
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domestic mergers and intra-Community mergers for income tax law purposes — 
and that in the earlier case of Kleinwort Benson there existed possibility of 
divergence in legal treatment between the internal and intra-Community 
situations. But apart from these considerations, putting aside conclusive 
previous holdings, the Leur-Bloem decision has clearly departed from Dzodzi in 
that it did not maintain the requirement of explicit reference to the Community 
_rules,33 and _ from _Kleinwort Beason in so far as it has thrown out the "direct and 
unconditional renvor test in the assessment of manifest inapplicability. In this 
decision the Court went further to extend its jurisdiction under Article 234 EC 
than it had done in Dzodzi or any other previous cases belonging to this line. 
Leur-Bloem's twin-case, Giloy which was decided on the same day covered 
similar factual situation and was concerned with the following question: to what 
extent had German tax law made the Community Customs Code applicable to 
the procedure relating to the levying of value-added taxes on imports (purely 
internal situation), and whether the Court had jurisdiction to interpret the Code 
for the purposes of clarifying some legal concepts and conditions in such an 
internal tax procedure. The outcome of the case was the same as that of Leur-
Bloem: the Court gave substantive ruling in the case. 
5. Lack of manifest inapplicability: "same solution" approach and the Leur-
Bloem test 
What has remained after Leur-Bloem and Giloy? What are the limits to the 
extent of the reach of Article 234 EC? Having renounced the demand for 
explicit reference to Community law the Court introduced the wider "same 
solution" approach. This conceptual turn was quickly reaffirmed in the 
subsequent cases of Kofisa and Adam. In Leur-Bloem the Court held that "where 
in regulating internal situations, domestic legislation adopts the same solutions 
as those adopted in Community law in order, in particular, to avoid 
discrimination against foreign nationals or, as in the case before the national 
court, any distortion of competition, it is clearly in the Community interest that, 
in order to forestall future differences of interpretation, provisions or concepts 
taken from Community law should be interpreted uniformly, irrespective of the 
circumstances in which they are to apply...i 34 Although, in drawing this 
33  I find it extremely difficult to agree with Kaleda's opinion that in Leur-Bloem the Court 
reaffirmed the reasoning of Dzodzi, see Kaleda, supra, p. 4. 
34 Case C-130/95 Bernd Giloy v Hauptzollamt Frankfurt am Main-Ost [1997] ECR 1-4291, 
par. 28.; Case C-28/95 A. Leur-Bloem v Inspecteur der Belastingdienst'Ondernemingen 
Amsterdam 2. [1997] ECR I-4161, par. 32., Case C-1/99 Kofisa Italia Srl v Ministero delle 
Finanze, Servizio della Riscossione dei Tributi — Concessione Provincia di Genova — San Paolo 
Riscossioni Genova SpA [2001] ECR 1-0207, par. 32., Case C-267/99 Christiane Urbing-Adam v 
Administration de l'enregistrement et des domaines [2001] ECR I-7467, par. 27. 
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conclusion, the Court referred to Dzodzi, (and only to Dzodzi), just the second 
half of the contention related strictly to paragraph 37 of that decision. Of course, 
the "same solution" approach can be traced back mutatis mutandis to Dzodzi, 
although Dzodzi can only be read in such a way as to set up the requirement that 
the national law should refer to Community law, and so, providing for the same 
solution by reference. However, Leur-Bloem and Giloy made use of the "same 
solution" concept without qualification, i.e. the same solution in any way, 
implying no need for explicit reference to Community rules. 35 In AG Kokott's 
view, under Leur-Bloem and Giloy, it has become irrelevant whether national 
law refers to Community law; what is decisive is only orientation in substance 
to Community law. 36 This "same solution" approach has prevailed in recent 
rulings, and been made part of a new test by which lack of manifest 
inapplicability could be ascertained. 37 
In the cases subsequent to Leur-Bloem, the following three-pronged test, 
substituting for the abandoned "direct and unconditional renvoa"' test, has been 
applied (Leur-Bloem test).38 As a principle, the lack of manifest inapplicability 
can be ascertained if, conjunctively, (1) the national legislation, in regulating 
internal situation at issue, provides the same solution as that adopted in 
Community law;39 and (2) the national legislation does not merely take the 
Community rules as a model and does not expressly provide that the national 
authorities may adopt amendments designed to give rise to divergence between 
35 Betlem, supra note 24., p. 172.; In Lefevre's view the Leur-Bloem judgment maintained 
the condition of direct and unconditional reference, which point does not seem to find  support in 
the text of the ruling; Leavre, supra note 5., p. 505. 
36  Case C-280/06 Autoritá Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato v Ente Tabacchi Italiani 
- ETI SpA and others [2007] ECR I-10893, per AG Kokott, par. 39. 
37 In view of these considerations the conclusion that in Leur-Bloem and Giloy the Court 
reverted to Dzodzi case-law after the exceptional case of Kleinwort Benson is unconvincing, 
O'Keeffe, supra note 13., p. 519.; Arnull, supra note 9., p. 109., Tridimas, supra note 5., p. 34., 
Anderson - Demetriou, supra note 4., p. 72. 
38 In the Andersen og Jensen case the Leur-Bloem test is used in other sense, see Case C-
43/00 Andersen og Jensen ApS v Skatteministeriet [2002] ECR I-0379, par. 14. 
39  Case C-28/95 A. Leur-Bloem v Inspecteur der Belastingdienst/Ondernemingen 
Amsterdam 2. [1997] ECR 1-4161, par. 32., Case C-130/95 Bernd Giloy v Hauptzollamt 
Frankfurt am Main-Ost [1997] ECR 1-4291, par. 28., Case C-1/99 Kofisa Italia Srl v Ministero 
delle Finanze, Servizio della Riscossione dei Tributi - Concession Provincia di Genova - San 
Paolo Riscossioni Genova SpA [2001] ECR I-0207, par. 32., Case C-300/01 Doris Salzmann 
[2003] ECR I-4899, par. 34., Case C-267/99 Christiane Urbing-Adam v Administration de 
l'enregistrement et des domaines [2001] ECR 1-7467, par. 27., Case C-43/00 Andersen og Jensen 
ApS v Skatteministeriet [2002] ECR I-0379, par. 18., Case C-222/01 British American Tobacco 
Manufacturing BV v Hauptzollamt Krefeld [2004] ECR I-4683, paras. 40-41., Case C-3/04 
Poseidon Chartering BV v Marianne Zeeschip VOF, Albert Mooij, Sjoerdtje Sijswerda, Gerrit 
Schram [2006] ECR I-2505, par. 16., Case C-280/06 Autoritá Garante della Concorrenza e del 
Mercato v Ente Tabacchi Italiani - ETI SpA and others [2007] ECR I-10893, pares. 21., 23., 
Case C-217/05 Confederación Espaíiola de Empresarios de Estaciones de Servicio v Compafiía 
Espaaiola de Petróleos SA [2006] ECR I-11987, par. 20. 
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the national provisions and the corresponding Community provisions; 4°  and (3) 
the national court is not empowered by national law to depart in the case from 
the Court's interpretation of the Community law. 41 
This test does not demand any explicit reference to Community law by the 
national legislation that regulates internal situations, and that is the most 
important consequence of the decisions made in the Leur-Bloem and Giloy 
cases._The_second_and__third__ prongs. _of the test _can _be_ traced _ back to the 
Kleinwort Benson case on the problems of which I have provided a short 
survey.42 But, as part of the Leur-Bloem test, the requirement that the national 
court be bound by the interpretation the Court gives in a case raises further 
problems. 
In Kleinwort Benson the Court saw problem in the fact that, as it construed, 
under the national law the referring court was not bound by the Court's 
decisions in cases where the Community rules (i.e. the 1968 Brussels 
Convention) applied to internal situations on the basis of national legal rules. 
The relevant part of the 1982 Act run as follows: "In determining any question 
as to the meaning or effect of any provision contained in Schedule 4: (a) regard 
shall be had to any relevant principles laid down by the European Court in 
connection with Title H of the 1968 Convention and to any relevant decision of 
that Court as to the meaning or effect of any provision of that Title...i 43 The 
Court disapproved of the phrase "regard shall be had to" which in its view did 
not imply the "absolute and unconditional" application of the interpretation of 
the Convention provided by the Court. That being the case, the phrase "regard 
shall be had to" indicated for the Court that the national court was free to decide 
4° Case C-28/95 A. Leur-Bloem v Inspecteur der Belastingdienst/Ondernemingen 
Amsterdam 2. [1997] ECR I-4161, par. 29., Case C-130/95 Bernd Giloy v Hauptzollamt 
Frankfurt am Main-Ost [1997] ECR I-4291, par. 25., Case C-217/05 Confederación Espanola de 
Empresarios de Estaciones de Servicio v Companía Espanola de Petróleos SA [2006] ECR I-
11987, par. 21., Case C-1/99 Kofisa Italia Srl v Ministero delle Finanze, Servizio della 
Riscossione dei Tributi - Concessione Provincia di Genova - San Paolo Riscossioni Genova SpA 
[2001] ECR I-0207, par. 30., Case C-306/99 Banque Internationale pour l'Afrique Occidentale 
SA (BIAO) v Finanzamt fir GroBunternehmen in Hamburg [2003] ECR I-0001, par. 93. 
41  See, e.g. Case C-28/95 A. Leur-Bloem v Inspecteur der Belastingdienst/Ondememingen 
Amsterdam 2. [1997] ECR 1-4161, par. 29., Case C-130/95 Bernd Giloy v Hauptzollamt 
Frankfurt am Main-Ost [1997] ECR I-4291, par. 25., Case C-1/99 Kofisa Italia Srl v Ministero 
delle Finanze, Servizio della Riscossione dei Tributi - Concessione Provincia di Genova - San 
Paolo Riscossioni Genova SpA [2001 ] ECR I-0207, par. 31., Case C-3/04 Poseidon Chartering 
BV v Marianne Zeeschip VOF, Albert Mooij, Sjoerdtje Sijswerda, Gerrit Schram [2006] ECR I-
2505, par. 18., Case C-280/06 Autoritá Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato v Ente Tabacchi 
Italiani - ETI SpA and others [2007] ECR I-10893, par. 28. In AG Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer's 
interpretation this requirement does not form part of the Leur-Bloem and Giloy decisions, Kofisa, 
supra, per AG Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, par. 50. - I would not share this view. 
42  As to the relation between Kleinwort Benson and Leur-Bloem (or Giloy), or to the turn 
made by the Court in the latter two cases, see further AG Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer's opinion 
delivered in the case of Kofisa, ibid., per AG Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, pares. 45-50. 
43 The text of the Act is cited by AG Tesauro's opinion delivered in the case, see par. 4. 
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whether or not the Court's interpretation of the Convention was applicable, or 
not, in resolving cases entailing purely internal situations 44 
How can the Court determine that a national court is not bound to follow its 
preliminary rulings under national legislation? How does the Court know it 
does not follow from the phrase "regard shall be had to" that the domestic court 
shall, in fact, follow preliminary decisions? The basic problem is that in many 
cases all this implies interpretation by the Court of the national rules in question 
— over which it clearly lacks jurisdiction under Article 234 EC. In Kleinwort 
Benson the Court did in fact give an interpretation to this phrase denying 
deference in this respect to the national court's view of the necessity of 
reference. 
In the subsequent cases of Kofisa and Poseidon Chartering, the Court gave a 
somewhat constricted and altered reading of this part of Kleinwort Benson, 
asserting that the national court should not be empowered to depart from the 
Court's interpretation given in the preliminary ruling and thereby suggesting 
that in these two cases the lack of explicit legal authorization for the courts to 
depart from Luxembourg case-law was an important factor. However, in 
Kleinwort Benson the national legislation did not explicitly empower national 
courts to depart from preliminary rulings either; it bound them to take the 
Court's jurisprudence into account. The possibility of departure was not 
established under an explicit authorization provision, but by way of the Court's 
interpretation leading to an outcome based on a negative inference or 
argumentum a contrario. To say that a national rule explicitly does not rule out 
the possibility of departing from the preliminary ruling is quite different from 
saying that a national rule empowers courts to depart from a preliminary ruling. 
This raises the problem of the degree of review which the Court may exercise 
over the national courts' competences to apply Community law under national 
law in cases embracing purely internal situations. In Kojsa a significant turn 
came about. 
Contrary to the Kleinwort Benson approach, where the Court set up a 
substantive requirement of "absolute and unconditional" application of a 
preliminary ruling it gave in the matter, in Kofisa the Court took a more lenient 
route in saying that "there is nothing in the file to indicate that the national court 
is empowered to depart from the Court's interpretation of the provisions". 45  The 
demand for an "absolute and unconditional" application has disappeared, and 
44  Case C-346/93 Kleinwort Benson Ltd. v City of Glasgow District Council [1995] ECR I-
0615, paras. 20-22. In contrast, the Court construed the 1982 Act as providing that the national 
courts were bound to follow the Court's interpretation of the 1968 Convention in disputes to 
which the Convention was by its own force to be applied. 
45 Case C-1/99 Kofisa Italia Srl v Ministero delle Finanze, Servizio della Riscossione dei 
Tributi — Concession Provincia di Genova — San Paolo Riscossioni Genova SpA [2001] ECR I-
0207, par. 31., see also Case C-3/04 Poseidon Chartering BV v Marianne Zeeschip VOF, Albert 
Mooij, Sjoerdtje Sijswerda, Gerrit Schram [2006] ECR I-2505, par. 18. 
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what has remained is the requirement that nothing in the file should indicate an 
explicit authorization for the referring court to depart from the Court's 
preliminary decision in handling the purely internal situation of the case ab  In 
my opinion Kleinwort Benson would have easily met such condition. 
Thus, the condition articulated in Kleinwort Benson has been converted, and 
in my view has necessarily been converted, on account of the jurisdictional 
limits of Article 234 EC, into a pure_ procedural _ question depending on the 
manner in which the questions were asked in the referral and on the material 
submitted to the Court:" If the referring court makes a clear statement relating 
to the necessity of reference in its referral and there is nothing in the file to the 
contrary, the Court will give a ruling. 
The low level of degree of review has been recently demonstrated in the ETI 
case where the Commission tried to keep the condition of "absolute and 
unconditional application" alive eight years after Kojsa. The Commission's 
argument was simply brushed aside by the Court satisfied that the Italian 
authorities had based their decisions in the dispute on Community rules and 
case-law, and that the Consiglio di Stato, as the referring court, had made its 
reference on the ground that it had considered the reference necessary for the 
purposes of giving a judgment according to the principles of Community 
competition law." So, the Court concluded to the existence of the national 
courts' obligation to apply (absolutely and unconditionally?) Community law 
and Luxembourg case-law from the fact that they had de facto applied them in 
the case. That is what I would regard as a quite low level of degree of review 
amounting to explicit overruling of Kleinwort Benson in this respect. 
6. Bottom of the slope: the useful answer doctrine 
The first prong of the Leur-Bloem test — the "same solution" approach — is not 
easy to apply in some circumstances. It requires that the Community law should 
be equally applied to internal situations as well as to those that fall directly 
within the scope thereof. If the reference by the national law to the Community 
law is too general and indirect, the Court will not be able to make sure of the 
applicability of Community law or the existence of the same solution possibly 
ensured by the national law and therefore will be forced to rely on the national 
court assessment. Here, the Court gives up the Leur-Bloem criteria in testing 
manifest inapplicability and puts stress on its function to support the national 
46 See e.g. Tridimas, supra note 5., p. 36. 
47 On account of this low-level of the degree of review, Kofisa and BIRO is regarded by 
Lefévre as a separate phase of Dzodzi case-law, Leftvre, supra note 5., p. 506. 
48 Case C-280/06 Autoritá Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato v Ente Tabacchi Italiani 
— ETI SpA and others [2007] ECR I-10893, par. 28. 
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court's decision by providing useful answers to the questions asked in the 
referral, abandoning any definite control over the substance of the reference. 
This trend has become apparent in the so-called reverse discrimination cases, 
which constitute a specific form of disputes when Community rules shall be 
applied to purely internal situations on the basis of national legislation 4 9 
Reverse discrimination arises when a Member State's nationals or domestic 
products are disadvantaged in internal situations under the applicable domestic 
law in comparison to those of the Member State or other Member States 
involved in intra-Community legal situations or at least having some tie with 
EC law, and therefore treated on more favorable terms within the scope of the 
Community law.50 In national legislations there may exist such rules which 
purport to eliminate reverse discrimination. That is why the !• elgian legislature 
inserted a specific rule . into the immigration law in the Dzodzi case in order to 
ensure that even internal situations be treated in the same manner as Community 
law eats intra-Community relations. 
However, the national legislation does not always entail a specific rule that 
can easily be identified by the Court in a preliminary ruling procedure as could 
be seen for example in Dzodzi. If the elimination of reverse discrimination is 
intended by general antidiscrimination clauses or principles of the domestic law, 
or even without such rules, simply by the case-law of national courts, the 
applicability of Community law will depend on how these general rules or the 
national courts' holdings that form part of the case-law can be construed. In 
these instances the Court will not be in a position to assess the applicability of 
Community rules that depend on the application of domestic principles or rules 
that have uncertain or even vague content. As a deeper consequence of the 
position taken by the Court from T homasdunger onwards — that is the Court has 
jurisdiction to inter ,eret Community rules that apply only by virtue of national 
law in an internal case —, the Court loses control over the substantive issues of 
relevancy in cases where the only possible basis of the applicability of 
Community law lies in general or vague internal rules. 
This most permissive approach on the part of the Court first became 
apparent in the decision of Guimont 51(a  reverse discrimination case) where, 
after having found that the particular case embraces wholly internal situation, it 
went further and held: 
22 However, that finding does not mean that there is no need to reply to 
the question referred to the Court for a preliminary ruling in this case. 
In principle, it is for the national courts alone to determine, h.ving 
49  Reverse discrimination cases are also regarded as a form of Dzodzi-like situations by e.g. 
Kaleda, pp. 3-4. or Ritter, supra note 29., pp. 690-710. • s° Ritter, ibid., p. 691., see also Craig, supra note 9., p. 762-763. 
51  Case C-448/98 Minisare Public v Jean-Pierre Guimont [2000] ECR I-10663, paras. 22— 
23. 
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regard to the particular features of each case, both the need for a 
preliminary ruling in order to enable them to give their judgment and 
the relevance of the questions which they refer to the Court. A reference 
for a preliminary ruling from a national court may be rejected only if it 
is quite obvious that the interpretation of Community law sought by that 
court bears no relation to the actual nature of the case or the subject-
matter of the main action [...]. 
23 In this case, it is not obvious that the interpretation of Community 
law requested is not necessary for the national court. Such a reply might 
be useful to it if its national law were to require, in proceedings such as 
those in this case, that a national producer must be allowed to enjoy the 
same rights as those which a producer of another Member State would 
derive from Community law in the same situation. 
This part of the decision illustrates the uncertainty as to what the national 
law says in the case. The Court, framing the second sentence of paragraph 23 in 
the conditional, clearly reckoned on the possibility that the Community rules it 
was interpreting would not be applied in the main proceedings. This may be the 
fearful situation the Court has always tried to avoid by refusing jurisdiction on 
the grounds that giving preliminary rulings of an advisory nature would alter the 
Court's function as envisaged by the EC Treaty. 
In Guimont, the Court, though referring to the general necessity criterion of 
Article 234 EC, appeared to renounce the Leur-Bloem test all together — the test 
which had constituted the remnants of substantive content of manifest 
inapplicability standard. Furthermore, it did not mention the manifest 
inapplicability standard itself, and simplified its final reasoning by pointing to 
the useful answer doctrine.52  As this doctrine, mainly in its subjective form, 
provides little guidance, provides no substantive control and gives way to a 
piecemeal, case-by-case jurisprudence, the Court seems to have given up the 
chance of a more controlling, principled approach to the jurisdictional issues of 
such cases. 53 
In subsequent cases the approach taken in Guimont that combines the useful 
answer doctrine with a reference to the necessity criterion or to the obvious 
irrelevancy standard seems to have settled into a consistent case-law in reverse 
discrimination cases. S4 Although it is uncertain whether the Community rules 
52  A fortiori, I am unable to discover such "essential similarity" between the Court's Dzodzi 
and Guimont holdings that Ritter discovered, see Ritter, supra note 29., p. 698. 
53  Bishop suggested in 1995, that the Court should leave the national court to decide whether 
a preliminary ruling necessary and apply the useful answer doctrine even in Dzodzi-like cases, 
Bishop, supra note 5., p. 501. In Guimont the Court has come dangerously close to this pre-Foglia 
situation. 
54 See e.g. Joined Cases C-515/99, C-519/99 to C-524/99 and C-526/99 to C-540/99 Hans 
Reisch and others v Bürgermeister der Landeshauptstadt Salzburg, Grundverkehrsbeauttragter des 
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interpreted by the Court will be applied by the referring court to the case at 
issue, the Court nevertheless gives a preliminary ruling, if it is not manifest that 
the interpretation of Community law sought bears no relation to the facts or the 
purpose of the action before the national court (obvious irrelevancy standard), 55 
or more generally, if it is not obvious that the interpretation of Community law 
requested is not necessary for the national court (necessity criterion). 56 
I: y the elimination of the Leur-Bloem test, and mainly the same solution 
approach, forming part of the content of the manifest inapplicability stand d, 
no obstacle seems to exist to the Court's extending the Guimont rule in the 
future to other types of Dzodzi-like cases if the reference by the domestic law to 
Community rules is vague or uncertain.S7 The formal requirement which has 
remained is — as seen in the decision of Centro Europa 7 — at the referring 
court "give indication" as to why it thinks that the preliminary ruling to be given 
by the Court is relevant to the main proceedings. 58 
Landes Salzburg; Anton Lassacher and others v Grundverkehrsbeauftragter des Landes Salzburg, 
Grundverkehrslandeskommission des Landes Salzburg [2002] ECR I-2157, par. 26.; Case C-
300/01 Doris Salzmann [2003] ECR 1-4899, par. 33.; Case C-6/01, Associntio Nacional de 
Operadores de Máquinas Recreativas (Anomar) and others and Estado portugués [2003] ECR I-
8621, par. 41.; Case C-451/03 Servizi Ausiliari Dottori Commercialisti Srl v Giuseppe Calafiori 
[2006] ECR I-2941, par. 29.; Joined Cases C-94/04 and C-202/04 Federico Cipolla v Rosaria 
Fazari, née Portolese, Stefano Macrino; Claudia Capodarte v Roberto Meloni [2006] ECR I-
11421, par. 30.; Case C-380/05 Centro Europa 7 Srl v Ministero delle Comunicazioni e Autoritá 
per le garanzie nelle comunicazioni, Direzione generale per le concessioni e le autorizzazioni del 
Ministero delle Comunicazioni, [2008] ECR I-0349, par. 53. 
55 See e.g. Joined Cases C-94/04 and C-202/04 Federico Cipolla v Rosaria Fazari, née 
Portolese, Stefano Macrino; Claudia Capodarte v Roberto Meloni [2006] ECR 1-11421, par. 28.; 
Case C-300/01 Doris Salzmann [2003] ECR I-4899, par. 35. 
56 See e.g. Case C-448/98 Ministére Public v Jean-Pierre Guimont [2000] ECR I-10663, par. 
23., Joined Cases C-515/99, C-519/99 to C-524/99 and C-526/99 to C-540/99 Hans Reisch and 
others v Rürgermeister der Landeshauptstadt Salzburg, Grundverkehrsbeauftragter des Landes 
Salzburg; Anton Lassacher and others v Grundverkehrsbeauftragter des Landes Salzburg, 
Grundverkehrslandeskommission des Landes Salzburg [2002] ECR I-2157, par. 26.; Case C-
6/01, Associa9lio Nacional de Operadores de Máquinas Recreativas (Anomar) and others and 
Estado portugués [2003] ECR I-8621, par. 41. 
57 See e.g. AG Kokott's view who says in ETI that the decisive factor in these cases is 
whether or not the reply to the questions referred can be useful to the national court, Case C-
280/06 Autoritá Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato v Ente Tabacchi Italiani - ETI SpA and 
others [2007] ECR 1-10893, per AG Kokott, par. 47. 
58 Case C-380/05 Centro Europa 7 Srl v Ministero delle Comunicazioni e Autoritá per le 
garanzie nelle comunicazioni, Direzione generale per le concessioni e le autorizzazioni del 
Ministero delle Comunicazioni; judgment of 31 January 2008, (not yet reported), par. 55. 
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7. Conclusions  
In MAO, referring to the Dzodzi line of cases, AG Jacobs pointed out that he did 
not consider "that it is correct to read total consistency in the Court's case-
law.i59 Neither do I. 
I have discussed the limited approach of Dzodzi plainly requiring reference 
to Community law_ _to pro_v_e_that_Community law is not manifestly inapplicable 
to a case. I have also covered the more principled approach of Kleinwort 
Benson. This ruling, although contrary to Dzodzi and Gmurzynska-Bscher in 
requiring direct and unconditional reference to Community law, still constituted 
a suitable basis for deciding future cases that involved wholly internal situations 
that were governed by Community law by force of national rules. However, the 
"direct and unconditional renvoi" test proved to be a transient solution tailored 
only to the facts of Kleinwort Benson. 
A sharp turn can be perceived in Leur-Bloem and Giloy, where a new three-
pronged test was introduced to substitute for the direct and unconditional renvoi 
that demands only a "same solution"  indication instead of reference to 
Community law. Though, in the case of BL40 the full Court had an opportunity 
to reconsider the whole Dzodzi jurisprudence,60 not surprisingly, that proved 
impossible — the slope built upon such cases as Leur-Bloem, Giloy, Kojisa or 
Guimont was too slippery and steep to stop. Moreover, within the Dzodzi line of 
cases, from Guimont onwards, a group of "reverse discrimination" cases has 
been separating. In these cases, the Court has left the Leur-Bloem test and the 
manifest inapplicability standard far behind, and given even a wider margin of 
appreciation to the national courts in controlling the necessary criterion of 
Article 2341 EC. 
Though often referred to, Dzodzi — apart from its central rule, which de facto 
already appeared in Thomasdünger — and, in part, the Kleinwort Benson 
holdings seem to be dead. Advocates General no longer challenge the Court's 
more lenient position first illustrated in Leur-Bloem and Giloy, and, for 
example, AGs Kokott and Sharpston have submitted strongly ?ro-Leur-Bloem 
opinions in the recent cases of ETI, CEPSA and SPF Finances. ó Recent rulings 
suggest that the Court firmly  follows the line of Leur-Bloem — and applies the 
59 Case C-306/99 Banque Internationale pour I'Afrique Occidentale SA (BIAO) v Finanzamt 
ftlr GroBunternehmen in Hamburg [2003] ECR 1-0001, per AG Jacobs, par. 49. 
60 Ibid., see also Lenaerts, supra note 3., p. 228., Arnull, supra note 9., 110-111. 
ó1 Case C-280/06 Autoritá Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato v Ente Tabacchi Italiani 
— ETI SpA and others [2007] ECR I-10893, per AG Kokott, paras. 19-64.; Case C-217/05 
Confederación Espanola de Empresarios de Estaciones de Servicio v Companía Espanola de 
Petróleos SA [2006] ECR I-11987, per AG Kokott, paras. 16-37.; Case C-48/07 État beige — 
SPF Finances v Les Vergers du Vieux Tauves SA; AG Sharpston's opinion delivered on 3 July 
2008, paras. 20-38. (not yet reported). 
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even more permissive Guimont principle, in some cases running distinctly 
parallel with the Lein-Bloem jurisprudence. 
BLUTMAN LÁSZLÓ 
A NYILVÁNVALÓ ALKALMAZHATATLANSÁG KÖVETELMÉNYE: 
A DZODZI ESET.ú®G ELGONDOLKODTATÓ TÖRTÉNETE 
(Összefoglalás) 
Az Európai Bíróság előzetes döntéshozatali eljárásokban gyakran találkozik 
azzal a helyzettel, hogy az értelmezendő közösségi jogot a tagállami bíróságok, 
a belső jog előírásai alapján, a közösségi jog hatályán kívüli jogesetekben 
kívánják alkalmazni. Alapvető problémaként vetődik itt fel az a kérdés, hogy a 
Bíróságnak van-e hatásköre eljárni, és előzetes döntést adni. A cikk áttekinti az 
erre vonatkozó luxemburgi joggyakorlatot, és következtetésként megállapítja, 
hogy a !: íróság e hatásköri kérdés elbírálása során legalább négyféle mércét 
alkalmazott az elmúlt húsz évben. Ez a négyféle mérce, mely a Dzodzi, a 
Kleinwort Benson, a Leur-Bloem és a Guimont ügyekben hozott ítéletekhez 
kapcsolódik, ellentmondásossá teszi a Bíróság vonatkozó esetjogát, melynek 
iránya mindazonáltal az, hogy a Bíróság egyre szélesebb körben biztosít ilyen 
ügyekben előzetes döntéshozatali hatáskört magának. 
